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IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
2009 UPDATE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
James J. Benjamin, Jr. *
As the U.S. strives for a vigorous response to the problem of radical Islamist terrorism, it seems self-evident that we must have a stable and effective
forum for prosecuting accused terrorists when such prosecutions are appropriate in light of the evidence and the law. In a recent study, we found
substantial data to support the proposition that the federal courts are capable of handling terrorism cases fairly and effectively without disclosing
classified information or jeopardizing national security. Our research
shows that although federal-court terrorism cases often present significant
challenges, judges and lawyers have generally managed to address and
overcome these problems and that the criminal justice system has proved
itself capable of handling a broad variety of terrorism prosecutions.
In May 2008, Human Rights First released In Pursuit of Justice:
Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts, a White Paper which I
co-authored with my then-law partner, Richard B. Zabel. 1 Based on a comprehensive review of more than one hundred and twenty actual prosecutions
dating back to the 1980s, In Pursuit of Justice concluded that the criminal
justice system is well-equipped to handle a broad variety of criminal cases
arising from terrorism that is associated—organizationally, financially, or
ideologically—with self-described “jihadist” or Islamist extremist groups
like al-Qaeda. The roster of cases chronicled in In Pursuit of Justice ranges
from blockbuster trials against hardened terrorists who planned or committed grievous acts around the world to complex terrorism-financing prosecutions and “alternative” prosecutions based on non-terrorism charges such as
immigration fraud, financial fraud, and false statements. Many of these cas*

Mr. Benjamin is a partner at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP and a former Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York.
1
See http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521-USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf. In Pursuit
of Justice is also referred to herein as the “White Paper.” In the fall of 2009, Mr. Zabel returned to government service as the Chief of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Attorney’s
Office for the Southern District of New York. The views expressed in this article are mine
alone and are not the views of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld or of other current or former Akin Gump attorneys.
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es were preemptive prosecutions focused on preventing and disrupting terrorist activities. In Pursuit of Justice acknowledged that terrorism prosecutions can present difficult challenges, and that the criminal justice system,
by itself, is not “the answer” to the problem of international terrorism, but it
found that the federal courts have demonstrated their ability, over and over
again, to effectively and fairly convict and incapacitate terrorists in a broad
variety of terrorism cases.
In the year after In Pursuit of Justice was issued, there were a number of important developments. On his second day in office, President Obama issued Executive Orders mandating the closure of the Guantánamo Bay
detention facility within one year and establishing a Detention Policy Task
Force to examine U.S. policy regarding the detention, interrogation, and
trial of individuals suspected of participating in terrorism. 2 The effort to
close Guantánamo has proved to be fraught with difficult policy and political choices and, more generally, our country continues to wrestle with the
complex problems posed by the scourge of terrorism. Apart from Guantánamo, our military forces remain deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan; the
situation in Pakistan is unstable; and radical Islamist groups continue to
threaten our national interests in many corners of the globe.
In this environment, there is broad consensus that the government
must continue to deploy all available resources—including military, intelligence, diplomatic, economic, and law enforcement tools—to address the
threat of international terrorism. It seems self-evident that, as an important
part of an integrated counterterrorism strategy, the government must have a
reliable, stable system in place for prosecuting accused terrorists when such
prosecutions are appropriate in light of the evidence and the law. The question remains as to where, and under what set of rules, terrorism prosecutions
should occur.
President Obama has expressed a preference for trying accused terrorists in federal court whenever possible, but in two separate public statements in May 2009, he signaled that the government expects to prosecute
some detainees in reconstituted military commissions with revised procedural rules. 3 The President also noted that the government intends to develop “clear, defensible, and lawful standards” for longer-term detention of

2

See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009); Exec. Order No.
13,493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,901 (Jan. 22, 2009).
3
See Barack Obama, U.S. President, Statement of President Barack Obama on Military
Commissions (May 15, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Statement-of-President-Barack-Obama-on-Military-Commissions; Barack Obama, U.S.
President, Remarks by the President on National Security at the National Archives (May 21,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-PresidentOn-National-Security-5-21-09.
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individuals who cannot be prosecuted but who the government believes
pose an unacceptably high risk to release. 4
The President offered these remarks against the backdrop of a vigorous and ongoing debate about how the government should prosecute
terrorists. Some commentators have agreed with the conclusion of In Pursuit of Justice that the justice system is equal to the task of handling a broad
swath of terrorism prosecutions, while others have posited that the federal
courts are unable to do so effectively—or that the risk of a prosecution that
does not yield a conviction is unacceptable—and that, as a result, Congress
should authorize a new “national security court” with lower evidentiary
standards or other prosecution-friendly features that would supplant the
Article III courts in some terrorism cases. 5
In July 2009, Mr. Zabel and I co-authored a supplement to In Pursuit of Justice, entitled 2009 Update and Recent Developments (“2009 Re4

Remarks by the President on National Security, supra note 3.
Compare THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, LIBERTY AND SEC. COMM. & COALITION TO
DEFEND CHECKS AND BALANCES, A CRITIQUE OF “NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS” (June 23,
2008), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Critique_of_the_National_
Security_Courts.pdf (arguing in favor of capability of criminal justice system to handle terrorism cases); Hon. Leonie Brinkema, Address at the American University Washington
College of Law/Brookings Institution Conference: “Terrorists and Detainees: Do We Need A
New National Security Court” (Feb. 1, 2008), available at http://www.wcl.american.
edu/podcast/ audio/20080201_WCL_TAD.mp3 (same); with Kevin E. Lunday & Harvey
Rishikof, Due Process Is a Strategic Choice: Legitimacy and the Establishment of an Article
III National Security Court, 39 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 87 (2008) (arguing in favor of national
security courts); Jack Goldsmith, Long-Term Terrorist Detention and Our National Security
Court, (Series on Counterterrorism and American Statutory Law, Working Paper No. 5,
2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/files/rc/papers/2009/0209_detention_
goldsmith/0209_detention_goldsmith.pdf (same); BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG
WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR (2008) (same); Amos N. Guiora &
John T. Parry, Light at the End of the Pipeline?: Choosing a Forum for Suspected Terrorists,
156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 356 (2008) (same). In a forthcoming symposium essay,
Professor Robert Chesney concludes that many of the leading criticisms of the capability of
the criminal justice system regarding terrorism are overstated, but notes “three sets of procedural safeguards that do tend to limit the reach of the criminal justice system in comparison
to existing or proposed alternatives” and discusses modest steps Congress might take to
optimize the criminal justice system for the task of prevention-oriented prosecution. Robert
M. Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, and the Preventive Detention Debate, 50 S.
TEX. L. REV. 669, 715 (2009). For a useful summary and trenchant critique of nationalsecurity-court proposals, see Stephen I. Vladek, The Case Against National Security Courts,
45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 505 (2009). Benjamin Wittes and Colleen A. Peppard of the Brookings Institution have recently issued a detailed procedural blueprint for new statutory detention authority that would supplement existing legal grounds for detaining alleged terrorists.
See BENJAMIN WITTES & COLLEEN A. PEPPARD, DESIGNING DETENTION: A MODEL LAW FOR
TERRORIST INCAPACITATION (Governance Studies at Brookings 2009), available at http://
www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0626_detention_wittes/0626_detention_
wittes.pdf.
5
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port”) and available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/090723-LS-inpursuit-justice-09-update.pdf. The 2009 Report takes a renewed look at the
capability of the federal courts to handle terrorism cases based on developments in the year since the White Paper was written. As was the case with
the original White Paper, the 2009 Report is grounded in actual data and
experience rather than abstract or academic theories. The 2009 Report identifies, examines, and analyzes the terrorism cases that were prosecuted in
federal court up through June 2009, including cases that were pending when
In Pursuit of Justice was issued in May 2008. In addition, outside the body
of traditional criminal prosecution case law, the 2009 Report examines
emerging case law sketching the contours of permissible law-of-war detention in the terrorism context. Although the 2009 Report might have missed
some cases, it continued the development of substantial data that provides a
foundation for examining the adequacy of the court system to cope with
terrorism cases.
The 2009 Report begins with an updated presentation of data about
terrorism prosecutions, including statistics through June 2, 2009. Statistical
highlights include a 91.1% conviction rate for terrorism cases commenced
after 9/11 and sentencing data showing that 89% of convicted terrorism
defendants since 9/11 have been sentenced to imprisonment, including eleven life sentences and an average sentence (excluding life sentences) of
100.98 months. 6 The 2009 Report then addresses some of the key legal and
practical issues that were presented in international terrorism cases between
May 2008 and June 2009. As was the case with the original White Paper,
the 2009 Report addresses topics as diverse as the scope and adequacy of
criminal statutes to prosecute alleged terrorists, the sufficiency of existing
legal tools to detain individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism, and
means of dealing with classified evidence. It also addresses the courts’ experience with evidentiary issues in terrorism cases, recent developments
regarding the applicability of the Miranda rule in overseas interrogations,
observations about sentencing proceedings in terrorism cases, and information confirming that the federal prisons have been able to maintain a high
degree of security over the accused and convicted terrorists confined within
them.
The 2009 Report concludes that the experience with terrorism cases
in the past year shows that prosecuting terrorism defendants in the court
system generally leads to just, reliable results and does not cause serious
security breaches or other problems that threaten the nation’s security. As a
result, the 2009 Report supports the view that the need for a new “national
6

See RICHARD B. ZABEL & J AMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., IN PURSUIT OF J USTICE PROSECUTING
TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: 2009 UPDATE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 9, 11
(2009), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/prosecute/.
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security court” is not apparent, especially given the numerous false starts
and problems associated with the prior failed effort to establish military
commissions at Guantánamo. Nor is it evident that the case has been made
for a brand-new legal regime to preventively detain individuals without
charge—especially when one considers the potentially damaging effects
such a momentous step could have on our legal system and culture. At the
same time, as in the White Paper, the 2009 Report acknowledges several
important qualifications on the conclusion about the efficacy of the Article
III courts to handle terrorism cases—namely that the justice system is not,
by itself, “the answer” to the problem of terrorism; that terrorism cases can
pose significant burdens and strains on the courts; and that the court system
is not infallible and will stumble from time to time.
As the 2009 Report emphasizes, the efficacy of the criminal justice
system in any particular case ultimately depends on the evidence. The 2009
Report commends the government for undertaking a detailed case-by-case
review of the evidence regarding each of the Guantánamo detainees, and
argues that the disposition of those cases should be guided, first and foremost, by the evidence. For many individuals, it may be the case that the
evidence will be sufficient to support federal-court prosecutions; but for
some individuals, that may not be the case. It remains to be seen, and may
never be known, how much damage to the viability of criminal prosecutions
was caused by the years of delay, among other things, that occurred before a
comprehensive assessment of admissible evidence took place.
Assuming sufficient evidence is available to bring a prosecution,
the 2009 Report observes that the most difficult challenges come up when
the potential criminal case arises out of or substantially overlaps with military or intelligence operations. The military services and our intelligence
agencies are proud institutions with deeply rooted traditions and practices,
and they do not always coexist easily with the norms and legal requirements
of the criminal justice system. But experience shows that when the government decides to bring terrorism prosecutions in federal court, the different
arms of the Executive Branch are capable of working together in order to
ensure that the cases proceed properly. The key is to institutionalize this sort
of coordination so that it can be replicated and in effect becomes “muscle
memory” among the relevant agencies and departments. The 2009 Report
notes that the current Detention Policy Task Force may be able to provide a
framework for better coordination in the future among the Department of
Justice, intelligence agencies, and the military.
Another significant challenge is that of resources. Managing large
terrorism cases is expensive and labor-intensive for all participants, including prosecutors, defense lawyers, the courts, and the prison system. It is
critical that sufficient resources be devoted on all sides so that cases are
handled correctly.
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As in the White Paper, the 2009 Report acknowledges that views on
the subject of prosecuting accused terrorists continue to be charged and will
vary. The 2009 Report acknowledges the difficulty of finding definitive
answers and reaching consensus on a subject that intertwines fundamental
questions of security, justice, and what our Nation exemplifies to the world.
The 2009 Report proceeds from the idea that a serious and objective analysis of the subject must rely on facts, and that idealized theories and doctrinaire approaches are not useful. The 2009 Report is intended to advance the
ongoing—and critically important—debate about how to reconcile our
commitment to the rule of law with the imperative of assuring security for
all Americans.

